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Introduction	  	  After	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  the	  federal	  government	  in	  the	  United	  States	  took	  over	  airline	  security	  in	  all	  but	  five	  airports	  and	  dictated	  standards	  even	  for	  those	  airports	  with	  private	  security.	  	  The	  federal	  government	  regulates	  in	  two	  main	  ways:	  by	  checking	  passengers	  with	  carry-­‐on	  items	  for	  bombs,	  guns,	  knives,	  etc.	  and	  by	  checking	  checked	  bags	  for	  explosives.	  	  There	  has	  been	  much	  discussion	  of	  the	  rationales	  and	  efficacy,	  and	  even	  some	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  of	  these	  measures.	  	  But	  no	  one	  in	  the	  literature	  has	  made	  a	  clearcut	  externality	  argument	  for	  government	  provision	  of	  or	  regulation	  of	  airline	  security.	  	  In	  this	  article,	  I	  make	  the	  market-­‐failure	  case,	  show	  what	  it	  justifies	  and	  doesn’t	  justify,	  and	  analyze	  the	  actual	  working	  of	  government	  provision	  of	  airline	  security.	  	  The	  analysis	  is	  a	  blend	  of	  standard	  microeconomic	  reasoning,	  numeracy,	  game	  theory,	  and	  public	  choice.	  	  My	  conclusion	  is	  that	  government	  provision	  of	  or	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regulation	  of	  airline	  security	  is	  unjustified	  and	  is	  inferior	  to	  free-­‐market	  alternatives.	  	  
Identifying	  the	  Externality	  in	  Airline	  Security	  	  Some	  scholars	  have	  tried	  to	  justify	  various	  government	  airline-­‐security	  measures	  based	  on	  externalities.	  	  But	  before	  making	  a	  case	  for	  a	  government	  solution,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  externality.	  	  	  
A	  Clarification	  	  Before	  proceeding	  to	  the	  argument,	  I	  must	  make	  an	  important	  clarification.	  	  Surely,	  one	  might	  think,	  there	  is	  a	  prima	  facie	  externality	  in	  airline	  security	  and	  that	  externality	  is	  from	  the	  terrorist	  who	  purposely	  imposes	  costs	  on	  innocent	  passengers.	  	  The	  terrorist	  does	  not	  internalize	  those	  costs.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  does	  not	  regard	  those	  costs	  to	  others	  as	  costs	  to	  himself.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  terrorist	  regards	  those	  costs	  to	  others	  as	  a	  desirable	  goal.	  	  Indeed,	  imposing	  costs	  on	  others	  is	  the	  whole	  point	  of	  terrorism.	  	  Far	  from	  regarding	  those	  costs	  as	  costs,	  and	  sees	  those	  costs	  as	  something	  desirable.	  	  That	  reasoning	  is	  correct,	  but	  the	  resulting	  externality	  is	  not	  one	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  this	  discussion.	  	  To	  see	  why,	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  extreme	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  an	  externality	  is	  to	  make	  the	  activity	  generating	  the	  externality	  illegal.	  	  The	  act	  of	  terrorism	  is	  already	  illegal	  and	  yet	  terrorists	  continue	  to	  commit	  terrorist	  acts.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  next	  step	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  to	  see	  if	  the	  airline	  or	  some	  other	  entity	  has	  the	  appropriate	  incentives	  to	  internalize	  these	  costs.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  given	  a	  probability	  of	  a	  terrorist	  act	  against	  an	  airline	  and	  its	  passengers,	  does	  the	  airline	  take	  account	  of	  all	  the	  potential	  damage	  done?	  	  We	  shall	  see	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  appropriate	  incentive	  when	  the	  terrorist	  can	  use	  the	  airplane	  as	  a	  weapon,	  as	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happened	  on	  September	  11,	  but	  does	  have	  the	  appropriate	  incentive	  to	  prevent	  the	  airplane	  from	  being	  destroyed	  by	  a	  bomb	  in	  a	  checked	  bag.	  	  	  
A	  Critical	  Review	  of	  the	  Literature	  on	  Externalities	  	   	  Kunreuther,	  Heal,	  and	  Orszag	  (2002)	  make	  an	  externality	  argument,	  without	  using	  the	  word	  “externality,”	  for	  having	  the	  government	  intervene	  in	  security	  for	  checked	  baggage.	  	  They	  write:	  	   Security	  problems	  are	  interdependent	  when	  a	  catastrophic	  risk	  faced	  by	  one	  firm	  is	  determined	  in	  part	  by	  the	  behavior	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  behavior	  of	  these	  others	  affects	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  first	  firm	  to	  reduce	  its	  exposure	  to	  the	  risk.	  In	  such	  situations	  security	  cannot	  generally	  be	  left	  purely	  to	  the	  private	  market	  and	  may	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  via	  some	  form	  of	  government	  intervention.	  	  .	  .	  .	  Interdependence	  occurs	  in	  airline	  security	  because	  an	  airline	  considering	  whether	  to	  install	  a	  baggage	  checking	  system	  must	  balance	  the	  cost	  (of	  installing	  and	  operating	  the	  system)	  with	  the	  benefit	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  reduced	  risk	  from	  passengers	  or	  luggage).	  The	  risk	  may	  arise	  not	  only	  from	  passengers	  who	  check	  in	  directly	  with	  this	  airline,	  but	  also	  from	  passengers	  who	  check	  bags	  on	  other	  airlines	  and	  then	  transfer	  without	  their	  luggage	  being	  screened	  at	  the	  origin	  or	  transfer	  point.	  A	  bag	  containing	  a	  bomb	  initially	  checked	  on	  another	  airline	  and	  then	  transferred	  to	  Pan	  Am	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  destruction	  of	  Pan	  Am	  flight	  103	  over	  Scotland	  in	  1988.	  Thus,	  even	  an	  airline	  with	  an	  infallible	  screening	  system	  is	  at	  risk,	  since	  only	  bags	  checked	  by	  passengers	  who	  initiate	  their	  trip	  with	  that	  airline	  are	  inspected;	  those	  bags	  transferred	  from	  another	  airline	  are	  not.	  The	  knowledge	  that	  investing	  in	  screening	  still	  leaves	  an	  airline	  vulnerable	  unless	  others	  do	  likewise	  reduces	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  investing	  in	  screening.	  	  Kunreuther	  et	  al	  recognize	  correctly	  that	  airlines	  will	  balance	  the	  cost	  against	  the	  benefit.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  airlines	  do	  so,	  one	  would	  expect	  an	  optimal	  decision.	  	  Why,	  then,	  do	  they	  not	  think	  the	  decision	  will	  be	  optimal?	  	  Their	  argument,	  quoted	  above,	  is	  that	  even	  though	  the	  airline	  makes	  the	  optimal	  decision	  in	  a	  closed	  system,	  checked	  bags	  can	  enter	  that	  system	  from	  passengers	  transferring	  from	  another	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airline.	  	  But	  surely,	  if	  Kunreuther	  et	  al	  can	  think	  of	  this	  possibility,	  so	  can	  those	  who	  run	  an	  airline.	  	  The	  airline	  would	  then	  weigh	  the	  added	  cost	  of	  screening	  bags	  that	  enter	  their	  system	  from	  other	  airlines	  against	  the	  benefit	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  There	  is	  no	  basis	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  airline	  will	  do	  too	  little	  such	  screening.	  	  Poole	  (2008)	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  people	  who	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  terrorism	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  take	  protective	  measures.	  	  He	  writes:	  	   However,	  if	  some	  components	  of	  a	  society	  present	  larger	  targets	  to	  terrorists,	  there	  is	  some	  justification	  for	  deciding	  that	  those	  who	  make	  use	  of	  that	  component	  should	  bear	  the	  costs.	  In	  this	  sense,	  security	  expenses	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  analogous	  to	  insurance.	  In	  general,	  in	  free	  societies,	  we	  allow	  people	  to	  engage	  in	  activities	  with	  various	  levels	  of	  risk	  (such	  as	  building	  homes	  in	  flood	  plains	  or	  on	  earthquake	  faults,	  or	  building	  and	  operating	  oil	  refineries).	  Those	  activities	  that	  are	  inherently	  higher-­‐risk	  generally	  carry	  higher	  insurance	  costs,	  reflecting	  those	  risks.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  high	  insurance	  costs	  generally	  provides	  incentives	  for	  those	  incurring	  those	  costs	  to	  take	  protective	  measures	  to	  minimize	  risks.	  In	  hindsight	  after	  9/11,	  U.S.	  airlines	  learned	  that	  their	  low-­‐performance	  contracts	  for	  passenger	  screening	  were	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task	  of	  coping	  with	  suicide-­‐bomb	  threats.	  If	  the	  federal	  government	  had	  not	  taken	  over	  that	  function	  shortly	  thereafter,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  airlines	  would	  have	  insisted	  on	  higher-­‐quality	  screening	  thereafter.	  	  	  His	  analogy	  between	  putting	  oneself	  at	  risk	  with	  the	  elements	  (e.g.,	  an	  earthquake)	  and	  putting	  oneself	  at	  risk	  of	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  is	  a	  good	  one.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  person	  who	  puts	  himself	  at	  risk	  can	  choose	  to	  assess	  the	  risk	  and	  to	  take	  appropriate	  measures.	  	  However,	  Poole	  overstates	  the	  case	  and	  makes	  a	  crucial	  omission.	  The	  overstatement,	  which	  is	  less	  important	  than	  the	  omission,	  is	  that	  those	  incurring	  costs	  will	  minimize	  risks.	  	  They	  will	  not	  minimize	  risk,	  nor	  should	  they.	  	  The	  way	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  an	  activity	  is	  to	  do	  none	  of	  it.	  	  Rather,	  what	  he	  should	  have	  written—and	  what	  he	  probably	  meant—is	  that	  those	  incurring	  costs	  will	  take	  account	  of	  these	  risks	  and	  weigh	  them	  against	  benefits.	  	  Poole’s	  omission	  is	  that	  he	  does	  not	  address	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  an	  airline’s	  response	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  terrorism.	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  airline	  does	  not	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  take	  account	  of	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all	  the	  risks	  from	  terrorist	  passengers.	  	  Mueller	  (2008)	  does	  an	  excellent	  analytic	  job	  of	  analyzing	  measures	  to	  protect	  the	  homeland,	  pointing	  out,	  for	  example,	  that	  when	  one	  potential	  target	  of	  terrorists	  is	  effectively	  protected,	  terrorists	  will	  simply	  move	  on	  to	  a	  high-­‐value,	  less-­‐protected	  target.	  	  But	  Mueller	  does	  not	  position	  his	  analysis	  in	  an	  externality	  framework	  and,	  therefore,	  does	  not	  distinguish,	  as	  this	  paper	  does,	  between	  security	  measures	  aimed	  at	  passengers	  and	  those	  aimed	  at	  checked	  bags.	  	  	  	  Finally,	  Cordes,	  Kirschner,	  and	  Levy	  (2006)	  make	  a	  multi-­‐pronged	  case	  for	  government	  security	  measures	  based	  on	  market	  failure.	  	  They	  write:	  	   A	  second	  major	  rationale	  for	  public	  sector	  involvement	  is	  to	  correct	  for	  externalities	  or	  spillover	  benefits	  and	  costs.	  Eighty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  the	  nation’s	  critical	  infrastructure	  identified	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  (DHS)	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  private	  sector.	  While	  owners	  of	  these	  structures	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  protect	  their	  facilities,	  the	  cost	  of	  an	  attack	  to	  society	  exceeds	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  owner.	  In	  such	  cases,	  there	  are	  external	  benefits	  from	  protecting	  infrastructure,	  and	  private	  spending	  on	  homeland	  security	  may	  be	  less	  than	  socially	  optimal.	  In	  other	  cases,	  such	  as	  airline	  screening	  of	  baggage,	  achieving	  a	  socially	  optimal	  amount	  of	  screening	  requires	  coordination/cooperation	  among	  multiple	  private	  parties,	  which	  may	  be	  more	  readily	  achievable	  with	  government	  guidance	  and	  intervention	  than	  without.	  In	  some	  cases,	  private	  efforts	  at	  hardening	  infrastructure	  can	  actually	  impose	  negative	  externalities	  by	  shifting	  terrorist	  threats	  elsewhere	  in	  society.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  baggage	  screening	  example,	  such	  cases	  may	  call	  for	  public	  intervention	  to	  minimize	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  such	  threat-­‐shifting.	  (pp.	  1-­‐2)	  	  Consider	  each	  step	  in	  this	  argument.	  	  Cordes	  et	  al	  are	  correct	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  an	  attack	  on	  a	  structure	  may	  exceed	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  owner.	  	  We	  shall	  see	  under	  what	  conditions	  this	  is	  true.	  	  The	  next	  sentence,	  that	  private	  spending	  on	  homeland	  security	  may,	  therefore,	  be	  less	  than	  optimal	  also	  follows.	  	  But	  they	  err	  in	  thinking	  that	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  coordination.	  	  The	  usual	  argument,	  once	  an	  externality	  is	  identified,	  is	  that	  any	  government	  intervention	  should	  be	  to	  cause	  the	  decision	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maker	  to	  take	  account	  of	  this	  externality	  and,	  thus,	  to	  “internalize”	  it.	  	  	  Interestingly,	  Cordes	  et	  al	  also	  make	  an	  externality	  argument	  where	  the	  externality	  goes	  the	  other	  way.	  	  They	  note	  that	  by	  hardening	  infrastructure,	  owners	  can	  shift	  terrorist	  threats	  elsewhere.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  although	  Cordes	  et	  al	  don’t	  come	  out	  and	  say	  it	  explicitly,	  they	  are	  arguing	  that	  owners	  of	  infrastructure	  may	  engage	  in	  
more	  than	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  protection.	  	  	  That	  is,	  according	  to	  their	  argument,	  the	  owners	  of	  infrastructure	  may	  make	  their	  infrastructure	  too	  safe.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  government	  intervention	  should,	  as	  they	  write,	  “minimize	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  such	  threat-­‐shifting.”	  	  Rather,	  government	  intervention	  should	  give	  an	  incentive	  to	  owners	  of	  infrastructure	  to	  provide	  less	  safety.	  	  	  	  Cordes	  et	  al	  make	  a	  further	  argument	  for	  government	  intervention.	  	  They	  write:	  	   Finally,	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11th	  have	  raised	  the	  specter	  of	  a	  new	  and	  potentially	  very	  costly	  business	  risk.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  natural	  hazards,	  such	  as	  floods	  and	  hurricanes,	  private	  insurance	  markets	  face	  challenges	  in	  providing	  insurance	  against	  such	  risks	  because	  losses	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  geographically	  concentrated.	  The	  government	  may	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  either	  providing	  some	  measure	  of	  insurance,	  or	  in	  facilitating	  the	  emergence	  of	  private	  insurance	  markets	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  current	  levels	  of	  investment.	  (p.	  2)	  	  Their	  argument	  is	  twofold:	  (1)	  that	  losses	  are	  geographically	  concentrated	  and	  (2)	  that	  government	  should	  “maintain	  current	  levels	  of	  investment.”	  	  Both	  arguments	  are	  faulty.	  	  First,	  insurance	  companies	  figured	  out	  long	  ago	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  geographically	  concentrated	  risks—and	  that	  is	  with	  reinsurance.	  	  Under	  reinsurance,	  an	  insurance	  company	  with	  a	  geographically	  concentrated	  set	  of	  customers	  lays	  off	  some	  of	  the	  risk	  to	  reinsurers	  such	  as	  Swiss	  Re	  and	  others.	  	  There	  is	  no	  market	  failure.	  	  Second,	  the	  optimal	  response	  to	  an	  increased	  risk	  is	  do	  less	  of	  the	  activity	  that	  led	  to	  the	  risk.	  	  A	  government	  that	  tries	  to	  “maintain	  current	  levels	  of	  investment”	  is	  essentially	  trying	  to	  get	  investors	  to	  act	  as	  if	  the	  risk	  is	  not	  higher.	  	  Not	  only	  is	  there	  no	  government	  failure	  here	  and	  no	  case	  for	  government	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intervention,	  but	  also	  government	  intervention	  aimed	  at	  maintaining	  investment	  would	  be	  non-­‐optimal.	  	  	  	  
Passengers’	  Lives	  	  Where	  does	  the	  externality	  in	  airline	  safety	  come	  from?	  	  First,	  consider	  a	  superficially	  plausible	  source	  of	  the	  externality:	  the	  lives	  of	  passengers.	  One	  might	  think	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  airline	  would	  not	  consider	  these	  lives	  because	  all	  the	  airline	  loses	  to	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  is	  its	  airplane.	  	  But	  that’s	  false.	  	  Potential	  passengers	  know	  that	  there	  is	  some	  risk	  of	  being	  killed	  or	  injured	  in	  a	  terrorist	  attack.	  	  They	  take	  account	  of	  this	  in	  the	  price	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  to	  travel.	  	  An	  airline	  that	  wishes	  to	  maximize	  its	  profit	  will	  produce	  security	  up	  to	  point	  where	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  doing	  so	  equals	  the	  marginal	  revenue.	  	  The	  marginal	  revenue	  from	  added	  security	  comes,	  in	  turn,	  from	  the	  increase	  in	  value	  that	  passengers	  place	  on	  this	  added	  security.	  	  So	  whatever	  value	  passengers	  put	  on	  their	  lives	  is	  reflected	  in	  their	  demand	  for	  security.	  	  	  	  A	  numerical	  example	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  	  Imagine	  that	  one	  million	  passengers	  are	  each	  willing	  to	  pay	  an	  extra	  $10	  for	  a	  small	  reduction	  in	  their	  probability	  of	  being	  victims	  of	  a	  terrorist	  attack.	  	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “small”	  because	  the	  probability	  of	  such	  an	  attack	  is	  already	  very	  low	  and	  so	  the	  probability	  can	  be	  reduced	  only	  by	  a	  small	  amount.	  	  Therefore	  the	  passengers	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  in	  total	  $10	  million	  for	  this	  small	  reduction.	  	  If	  the	  airline	  can	  achieve	  this	  small	  reduction	  in	  probability	  by	  spending	  $9	  million,	  then	  it	  will	  do	  so	  because	  it	  will	  net	  $1	  million:	  $10	  million	  from	  the	  passengers	  in	  a	  $10-­‐higher	  air	  fare	  per	  passenger	  minus	  the	  $9	  million	  cost.	  	  The	  airline	  will	  continue	  to	  reduce	  risk	  up	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  marginal	  revenue	  equals	  the	  marginal	  cost.	  	  And,	  as	  noted,	  this	  marginal	  revenue	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  value	  that	  passengers	  place	  on	  this	  increased	  safety.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  airline	  internalizes	  the	  value	  of	  safety	  to	  the	  passengers	  and	  provides	  safety	  accordingly.	  	  In	  short,	  no	  externality	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  airline	  owns	  only	  the	  airplanes	  and	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not	  the	  passengers.1	  	  
Airplanes	  as	  Weapons	  	  So	  far,	  we	  have	  established	  that	  no	  relevant	  externality	  arises	  from	  the	  potential	  damage	  that	  terrorists	  can	  do	  to	  either	  an	  airline’s	  airplanes	  or	  its	  passengers.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  airline	  has	  the	  appropriate	  incentive	  to	  trade	  off	  the	  cost	  of	  security	  against	  the	  benefits2.	  	  	  	  But	  there	  is	  one	  type	  of	  cost	  that	  the	  airline,	  absent	  liability,	  does	  not	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  care	  about:	  the	  cost	  to	  those	  outside	  the	  airplane	  who	  are	  damaged	  when	  the	  terrorist	  uses	  the	  airline	  as	  a	  weapon.	  	  As	  we	  learned	  on	  September	  11,	  that	  was	  what	  the	  terrorists	  did.	  	  The	  reason	  this	  cost	  is	  not	  internalized	  is	  that	  the	  people	  who	  bear	  the	  cost	  have	  no	  market	  relationship	  with	  the	  airline.	  	  They	  do	  not	  buy	  tickets	  to	  fly:	  they	  are,	  rather,	  innocent	  victims	  who	  cannot	  express	  their	  desire	  for	  safety	  through	  a	  market	  transaction.	  	  The	  externality,	  in	  short,	  is	  the	  airline’s	  failure	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  cost	  imposed	  on	  others	  not	  in	  the	  airplane	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  airplane	  is	  used	  as	  a	  weapon.	  	  
Checked	  Bags	  	  The	  reasoning	  directly	  above	  also	  means	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  externality	  with	  explosives	  in	  checked	  bags.	  	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  explosive	  must	  be	  timed	  to	  go	  off	  and	  it	  can’t	  easily	  be	  timed	  to	  go	  off	  when	  it	  is	  to	  harm	  people	  outside	  the	  airplane.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  when	  the	  Lockerbie	  bomber	  blew	  up	  a	  Pan-­‐Am	  Boeing	  747	  in	  midair	  over	  Scotland	  in	  1988,	  some	  of	  the	  pieces	  fell	  onto	  homes	  in	  Lockerbie	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  reasoning	  in	  this	  paragraph	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  reasoning	  in	  W.	  Kip	  Viscusi,	  Risk	  
by	  Choice.	  1983.	  2	  I’m	  ignoring	  the	  point	  made	  by	  Cordes	  et	  al	  that	  airlines	  might	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  provide	  too	  much	  security.	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killed	  eleven	  people	  in	  these	  homes.	  	  But	  that	  was	  an	  extremely	  unlikely	  occurrence.	  	  In	  the	  much	  more	  typical	  case,	  the	  exploding	  bomb	  will	  harm	  people	  on	  the	  airplane	  and	  the	  airplane	  itself.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  everyone	  involved	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  take	  account	  of	  this	  damage	  in	  choosing	  whether	  to	  fly	  as	  passengers,	  or,	  in	  the	  airline’s	  case,	  whether	  to	  fly	  the	  airplane	  and	  how	  much	  security	  to	  provide.	  	  	  
Solutions	  to	  the	  Externality	  Problem	  	  When	  an	  externality	  is	  identified,	  the	  usual	  next	  step	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  to	  consider	  whether	  and	  how	  to	  internalize	  the	  externality.	  	  Three	  kinds	  of	  solutions	  are	  usually	  identified:	  (1)	  tax	  the	  activity	  that	  generates	  the	  externality,	  (2)	  regulate	  the	  activity	  that	  generates	  the	  externality,	  and	  (3)	  make	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  externality	  liable	  for	  the	  damages	  caused,	  either	  with	  a	  liability	  rule	  or	  by	  broadening	  property	  rights.	  	  Interestingly,	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  discussion	  has	  been	  about	  the	  second	  option	  above.	  	  Within	  that	  option,	  the	  one	  chosen	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government	  is	  the	  most	  extreme:	  go	  beyond	  simple	  regulation	  to	  government	  provision.	  	  In	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  airports,	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  Transportation	  Security	  Administration	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  security.	  	  But	  even	  those	  who	  are	  skeptical	  of	  government	  provision	  of	  goods	  and	  services,	  such	  as	  Poole,	  have	  taken	  as	  given	  that	  government	  should	  regulate.	  	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  discuss	  all	  three	  options.	  	  
Tax	  the	  Activity	  That	  Generates	  the	  Externality	  	  This	  option,	  proposed	  by	  the	  British	  economist	  Arthur	  Cecil	  Pigou,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  way	  to	  reduce	  an	  externality	  to	  the	  optimal	  level	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  activity	  that	  generates	  the	  externality.	  	  Such	  a	  solution	  would	  work	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  fixed	  relationship	  between	  the	  activity—flying	  airplanes—and	  the	  externality—the	  damage	  done	  to	  people	  outside	  the	  airplane	  when	  the	  airplane	  is	  used	  as	  a	  weapon.	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  But,	  of	  course,	  as	  everyone	  involved	  in	  the	  discussion	  recognizes,	  either	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  fixed	  relationship.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  goal	  of	  most	  people	  who	  advocate	  any	  solution	  to	  the	  problem—government	  or	  private—is	  to	  reduce	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  given	  airplane	  will	  be	  turned	  into	  a	  weapon.	  	  	  	  
Government	  Regulation	  
	  There	  are,	  broadly	  speaking,	  three	  kinds	  of	  government	  regulation,	  and	  they	  are	  listed	  here	  in	  increasing	  degree	  of	  government	  intrusion:	  	  (1)	  The	  government	  decides	  on	  a	  desirable	  outcome	  and	  lets	  the	  airline	  decide	  how	  to	  achieve	  it.	  	  The	  government	  could,	  for	  example,	  tell	  an	  airline	  that	  it	  must	  achieve	  a	  95	  percent	  probability	  of	  catching	  a	  passenger	  with	  an	  explosive	  or	  a	  weapon.	  	  To	  enforce	  the	  standard,	  the	  government	  would	  then	  send	  people	  through	  with	  explosives	  and/or	  weapons	  and	  measure	  the	  airline’s	  success;	  (2)	  The	  government	  dictates	  to	  the	  airline	  how	  it	  must	  set	  up	  airline	  security—what	  technologies	  it	  must	  use,	  what	  the	  airline	  must	  ban,	  etc.;	  (3)	  The	  government	  decides	  to	  provide	  airline	  security	  using	  government	  employees.	  	  Some	  degree	  of	  government	  regulation	  has	  existed	  since	  the	  early	  1970s,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  government	  responded	  to	  the	  late	  1960s	  hijackings	  to	  Cuba	  by	  insisting	  that	  airlines	  check	  people	  for	  weapons.	  	  Notice,	  though,	  that	  the	  government	  never	  tried	  option	  (1).	  	  	  	  Let’s	  compare	  these	  options.	  	  	  	  Because	  option	  (1)	  would	  allow	  the	  airline	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal,	  the	  airline,	  which	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  minimize	  cost	  for	  a	  given	  achievement	  of	  a	  goal,	  would	  tend	  to	  choose	  methods	  that	  are	  most	  appropriate	  for	  achieving	  the	  goal.	  	  The	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airlines	  could	  rely	  on	  the	  “local	  knowledge3”	  they	  have	  of	  customers—letting	  those	  they	  recognize	  as	  frequent	  flyers,	  for	  example,	  go	  through	  a	  less-­‐intrusive	  search.	  	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  letting	  the	  airline	  choose	  would	  be	  the	  best	  of	  the	  three	  regulatory	  alternatives.	  	  	  	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  option	  (1)	  is	  not	  the	  best	  because	  the	  government	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  specify	  very	  clearly	  the	  desirable	  goal	  it	  wishes	  to	  achieve.	  	  But	  if	  the	  government	  can’t	  specify	  the	  goal	  clearly,	  then	  all	  three	  methods	  are	  in	  doubt.	  	  With	  option	  (2),	  the	  government	  would	  have	  to	  have	  a	  desirable	  goal	  in	  mind	  in	  order	  to	  dictate	  the	  methods	  and	  technologies	  used.	  	  And	  with	  option	  (3),	  the	  government	  would	  also	  need	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  goal	  so	  that	  it	  can	  itself	  choose	  how	  to	  conduct	  its	  own	  operations.	  	  	  	  Option	  (2)	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  worse	  than	  option	  (1)	  for	  the	  reason	  given	  above:	  the	  government	  has	  no	  good	  way	  of	  judging	  whether	  the	  rules	  it	  enforces	  are	  good	  rules.	  	  It	  lacks	  the	  local	  knowledge	  mentioned	  earlier	  and	  tends	  to	  use	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  rules.	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration,	  before	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  told	  passengers	  that	  if	  ever	  a	  hijacking	  occurred,	  they	  should	  be	  passive.	  	  This	  passivity	  among	  the	  passengers	  of	  three	  of	  the	  four	  airplanes	  contributed,	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  disaster.	  	  Or	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  FAA	  still	  finds	  it	  important,	  in	  a	  society	  in	  which	  people	  have	  been	  familiar	  with	  seatbelts	  for	  over	  forty	  years,	  to	  require	  airlines,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  every	  flight,	  to	  show	  passengers	  how	  to	  fasten	  a	  seatbelt.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  could	  have	  been	  a	  chance	  for	  people	  to	  rethink	  rules,	  the	  seatbelt	  demonstration	  rule	  is	  still	  with	  us.	  	  	  	  Option	  (2)	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  better	  than	  option	  (3).	  	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  under	  option	  (2),	  the	  airline	  still	  must	  be	  concerned	  about	  cost.	  	  It	  will	  care	  about	  its	  own	  costs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Friedrich	  Hayek,	  “The	  Use	  of	  Knowledge	  in	  Society,”	  American	  Economic	  
Review,	  Vol.	  35,	  No.	  4,	  1945,	  pp.	  519-­‐530.	  	  Online	  at:	  http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.html	  Although	  Hayek’s	  article	  is	  about	  how	  free	  markets	  allow	  people	  to	  use	  their	  local	  knowledge,	  he	  does	  not	  use	  the	  term	  “local	  knowledge.”	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because	  those	  costs	  subtract	  from	  profitability.	  	  It	  will	  care	  about	  costs	  imposed	  on	  passengers	  because	  those	  costs	  deter	  potential	  passengers	  from	  using	  the	  airline	  and,	  even	  for	  those	  passengers	  who	  are	  not	  deterred,	  the	  hassle	  costs,	  both	  in	  time	  and	  loss	  of	  privacy,	  will	  subtract	  from	  the	  amount	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  pay.	  	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  passengers	  will	  value	  the	  added	  safety	  that	  these	  costs	  create—and	  that	  is	  correct.	  	  But,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  section	  above	  titled	  “Passengers’	  Lives,”	  the	  airline	  already	  has	  the	  appropriate	  incentive	  to	  care	  about	  passenger	  safety.	  	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  the	  externality	  component—the	  damage	  that	  the	  airplane	  as	  a	  weapon	  can	  do	  to	  those	  outside	  the	  plane.	  	  It	  is	  here	  that	  many	  passengers	  will	  not	  be	  thankful	  because	  the	  people	  saved	  are	  not	  themselves	  or,	  more	  accurately,	  are	  not	  only	  themselves.	  	  By	  contrast,	  a	  problem	  with	  option	  (3),	  as	  noted	  by	  Henderson	  (2001),	  is	  that	  the	  government	  does	  not	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  the	  tradeoff	  between	  security	  and	  hassle	  costs.	  	  If	  the	  passenger	  does	  not	  get	  to	  his	  flight,	  this	  is	  an	  upset	  for	  both	  the	  passenger	  and	  the	  airline	  but	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  upset	  for	  the	  government.	  	  	  	  Option	  (3),	  therefore,	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  worst	  of	  the	  three.	  	  Indeed,	  there	  are	  so	  many	  problems	  with	  option	  (3)	  that	  a	  whole	  section	  dealing	  with	  option	  (3)	  is	  in	  order.	  	  
Government	  Provision	  	  	  	  Government	  provision	  of	  airline	  security	  has	  five	  main	  problems,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  mentioned	  above.	  	  The	  first,	  as	  noted,	  is	  that	  the	  government	  does	  not	  have	  to	  trade	  off	  the	  costs	  to	  the	  passengers	  against	  added	  security.	  	  The	  second	  is	  that	  because	  government	  employees	  are	  typically	  difficult	  to	  fire,	  they	  are	  less	  accountable	  than	  private	  employees.	  	  The	  third	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  government	  is	  in	  the	  position	  of	  a	  central	  planner	  and	  doesn’t,	  therefore,	  have	  the	  local	  knowledge	  it	  would	  need	  to	  make	  good	  decisions.	  	  The	  fourth	  problem	  is	  the	  government	  has	  little	  incentive	  to	  produce	  security	  well	  and,	  moreover,	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  cover	  up	  its	  lack	  of	  quality	  and	  efficiency.	  	  The	  fifth	  problem	  is	  that	  government	  agencies	  tend	  to	  find	  ways	  to	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expand	  their	  budgets	  and	  their	  responsibilities,	  even	  when	  those	  added	  responsibilities	  have	  only	  a	  tenuous	  connection	  with	  the	  original	  goal.	  	  Consider	  each	  in	  turn.	  	  The	  first	  point,	  that	  the	  government	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  trade	  off	  costs	  to	  passengers	  against	  airline	  security,	  requires	  little	  elaboration	  at	  a	  theoretical	  level.	  	  The	  incentive	  not	  to	  care	  about	  passenger	  costs	  and	  convenience	  is	  obvious.	  	  But	  at	  an	  empirical	  level,	  there	  is	  already	  much	  evidence	  for	  this	  statement.	  	  Bovard	  (2003)	  gives	  a	  number	  of	  instances	  of	  TSA	  officials	  closing	  down	  whole	  sections	  of	  airports	  and,	  indeed,	  whole	  airports	  for	  hours	  after	  a	  TSA	  official	  found	  something	  suspicious.	  	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  suspicious	  item	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  gumbo—in	  the	  New	  Orleans	  airport,	  of	  all	  places.	  	  In	  another	  case,	  someone	  discovered	  a	  pair	  of	  scissor	  in	  a	  trash	  can4.	  	  Consider	  the	  second	  problem:	  government	  employees	  are	  difficult	  to	  fire	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  less	  accountable	  than	  private	  employees.	  	  All	  other	  things	  equal,	  this	  makes	  it	  harder	  for	  a	  government	  agency	  pursuing	  a	  particular	  goal	  than	  for	  a	  private	  organization	  pursuing	  the	  same	  goal	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal.	  	  	  	  The	  third	  problem—the	  knowledge	  problem—also	  strengthens	  the	  case	  against	  government	  provision.	  	  By	  setting	  up	  a	  central	  government	  agency	  with	  no	  market	  signals	  and	  no	  market	  test,	  the	  government	  is	  essentially	  helpless	  at	  making	  good	  decisions	  about	  security.	  	  This	  problem	  applies	  whether	  the	  government	  tries	  to	  produce	  security	  on	  its	  own—as	  it	  now	  does	  with	  the	  TSA—or	  regulates	  to	  required	  private	  production.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  there	  is	  a	  knowledge	  problem.	  	  The	  knowledge	  problem,	  though,	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  severe	  with	  outright	  government	  provision	  because	  the	  incentives	  to	  get	  the	  knowledge	  are	  even	  more	  attenuated.	  	  The	  fourth	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  government	  has	  little	  incentive	  to	  do	  its	  job	  well	  and,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  Bovard	  (2003),	  pp.	  178-­‐179.	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in	  fact,	  has	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  cover	  up	  and	  defend	  its	  failings.	  	  Bovard	  (2003)	  gives	  ample	  evidence	  of	  this.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration’s	  “Red	  Team,”	  created	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Pan	  Am	  explosion	  of	  1988,	  was	  grounded	  in	  February	  2002,	  after	  John	  Dzakovic,	  a	  Red	  Team	  leader,	  went	  public	  with	  his	  charge	  that	  the	  FAA	  had	  regularly	  ignored	  his	  reports	  in	  earlier	  years	  about	  the	  poor	  state	  of	  airline	  security.	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  poor	  state	  was	  “achieved”	  with	  private	  security	  employees,	  but	  one	  would	  think	  that	  if	  the	  government	  wanted	  to	  improve	  security,	  it	  would	  keep	  the	  Red	  Team	  in	  place	  and	  continue	  testing.	  	  Not	  so.	  	  Instead,	  the	  Department	  of	  Transportation	  responded	  to	  Dzakovic’s	  revelations	  by	  grounding	  the	  Red	  Team’s	  top	  inspectors	  and,	  instead,	  assigning	  them	  to	  reply	  to	  letters	  from	  Congressional	  offices5.	  	  	  	  	  After	  the	  U.S.	  government	  took	  over	  airline	  security	  in	  February	  2002,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  did	  get	  active	  at	  trying	  to	  identify	  security	  threats.	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  things	  it	  did	  was	  arrest	  over	  one	  thousand	  airport	  employees.	  	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  them	  were	  people	  who	  had	  mistakenly	  or	  purposely	  filed	  false	  statements	  on	  employment	  forms	  or	  used	  fake	  Social	  Security	  numbers.	  	  Although	  U.S.	  Attorney	  Paul	  McNulty	  called	  the	  raids	  on	  employees	  of	  the	  Dulles	  and	  Reagan	  airports	  an	  “anti-­‐terrorism	  initiative,”	  he	  admitted	  that	  had	  “no	  evidence	  at	  this	  point	  of	  any	  connection	  of	  these	  individuals	  to	  any	  terrorist	  organizations6.”	  Summing	  up	  this	  and	  other	  federal	  raids,	  Bovard	  writes	  that	  “the	  feds	  concentrated	  their	  resource[s]	  on	  janitors	  who	  wrote	  the	  wrong	  number	  on	  a	  job	  application.”	  	  The	  fifth	  problem	  is	  the	  public	  choice	  problem	  that	  government	  agencies	  tend	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  expanding	  authority	  and	  budgets7.	  	  Putting	  the	  government	  in	  the	  role	  of	  direct	  provider	  of	  security	  puts	  in	  place	  a	  ready	  special-­‐interest	  lobby	  with	  strong	  ties	  to	  the	  Washington	  bureaucracy—since	  it’s	  already	  part	  of	  the	  bureaucracy—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Bovard	  (2003),	  p.	  178.	  6	  Quoted	  in	  Bovard	  (2003),	  p	  184.	  7	  Niskanen	  (1971)	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  bureaucrats	  try	  to	  maximize	  their	  budget.	  	  Doing	  so	  would,	  of	  course,	  cause	  them	  to	  defend	  current	  missions	  and	  advocate	  expanding	  their	  responsibilities.	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and	  strong	  ties	  to	  Congress.	  	  The	  government	  agency	  then	  has	  both	  a	  substantial	  incentive	  and	  a	  ready	  path	  for	  expanding	  its	  power.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  current	  director	  of	  the	  TSA,	  John	  Pistole,	  upon	  taking	  his	  job,	  stated	  that	  he	  wanted	  TSA	  workers	  to	  work	  as	  a	  “national-­‐security,	  counterterrorism	  organization,	  fully	  integrated	  into	  U.S.	  government	  efforts.”	  	  He	  openly	  stated	  his	  plan	  to	  involve	  TSA	  in	  protecting	  riders	  on	  mass-­‐transit	  systems.	  	  He	  told	  USA	  Today:	  	   Given	  the	  list	  of	  threats	  on	  subways	  and	  rails	  over	  the	  last	  six	  years	  going	  on	  seven	  years,	  we	  know	  that	  some	  terrorist	  groups	  see	  rail	  and	  subways	  as	  being	  more	  vulnerable	  because	  there's	  not	  the	  type	  of	  screening	  that	  you	  find	  in	  aviation.	  	  From	  my	  perspective,	  that	  is	  an	  equally	  important	  threat	  area.	  (Frank,	  2010).	  	  Pistole	  added,	  “I	  want	  to	  take	  TSA	  to	  the	  next	  level.”	  	  Of	  course,	  Pistole	  has	  already	  added	  another	  level—the	  “naked	  picture	  or	  grope”	  and,	  for	  some,	  the	  “naked	  picture	  and	  grope”	  method	  that	  that	  the	  TSA	  is	  phasing	  in	  at	  U.S.	  airports.	  	  	  	  Finally,	  Pistole	  announced	  in	  late	  January	  2011	  that	  he	  would	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  some	  airports’	  plans	  to	  shift	  from	  TSA	  to	  private	  contractors.	  	  Pistole	  stated	  that	  he	  had:	  	   examined	  the	  contractor	  screening	  program	  and	  decided	  not	  to	  expand	  the	  program	  beyond	  the	  current	  16	  airports	  as	  I	  do	  not	  see	  any	  clear	  or	  substantial	  advantage	  to	  do	  so	  at	  this	  time.	  	  This	  defense	  of	  his	  bureaucracy’s	  purview	  is	  consistent	  with	  my	  reasoning	  above.	  	  	  	  
Government	  Regulation:	  The	  Central	  Planning	  Problem	  	  All	  three	  forms	  of	  regulation	  discussed	  above	  are	  versions	  of	  central	  planning,	  going	  from	  the	  least	  extreme—judging	  airlines	  by	  their	  achievement	  of	  various	  measures—to	  the	  most	  extreme—having	  a	  government	  agency	  and	  government	  employees	  provide	  the	  security.	  	  	  Therefore	  one	  problem	  that	  all	  three	  forms	  of	  regulation	  have	  is	  the	  “knowledge	  problem.”	  	  In	  option	  (1),	  the	  government	  needs	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knowledge	  in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  measures	  to	  use	  to	  judge	  airlines.	  	  In	  option	  (2),	  the	  government	  requires	  knowledge	  so	  that	  it	  can	  decide	  what	  kinds	  of	  regulations	  to	  impose	  on	  airlines.	  	  In	  option	  (3),	  the	  government	  needs	  the	  same	  knowledge	  as	  in	  option	  (2)	  and,	  as	  noted,	  option	  (3)	  has	  the	  added	  problems	  that	  go	  with	  having	  government	  be	  the	  producer.	  	  	  Cleveland	  and	  Price	  (2003)	  point	  out	  some	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  use	  of	  option	  (2).	  	  These	  would	  apply	  just	  as	  much	  to	  option	  (3)	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  to	  option	  (1).	  	  Cleveland	  and	  Price	  write:	  	   One	  likely	  factor	  in	  the	  airlines’	  failure	  to	  thwart	  the	  terrorists	  was	  that	  the	  FAA	  did	  not	  allow	  them	  to	  protect	  their	  property	  by	  arming	  their	  employees.	  Box	  cutters	  were	  the	  most	  deadly	  weapons	  on	  the	  planes	  used	  in	  the	  attacks	  because	  the	  FAA	  prohibited	  the	  pilots	  from	  being	  armed.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  hijackers	  easily	  commandeered	  the	  aircraft.	  Had	  the	  pilots	  or	  the	  cabin	  crew	  had	  access	  to	  superior	  weapons,	  they	  might	  have	  been	  able	  to	  use	  them	  to	  protect	  their	  lives	  and	  the	  airlines’	  property.	  However,	  “Title	  14,	  Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations,	  Part	  108.11	  only	  allows	  armed	  planes	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  FAA”	  (Tucker	  2002).	  Because	  the	  FAA	  has	  not	  allowed	  guns	  on	  planes	  since	  the	  end	  of	  Nixon’s	  sky-­‐marshal	  program	  in	  1973,	  airplanes	  have	  been	  susceptible	  to	  hijacking	  for	  years.	  This	  situation	  provides	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  basic	  knowledge	  problem	  of	  central	  planning.	  Jane	  Garvey,	  an	  FAA	  administrator,	  reported	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  (September	  25,	  2001)	  that	  permitting	  guns	  on	  planes	  was	  not	  even	  considered	  and	  never	  would	  have	  been	  approved	  before	  the	  attacks	  of	  September	  11	  (cited	  in	  Tucker	  2002).	  Although	  the	  FAA	  briefly	  considered	  altering	  its	  rule,	  it	  nevertheless	  stood	  firm	  and	  decided	  to	  continue	  its	  ban.	  This	  action	  is	  precisely	  the	  kind	  of	  know-­‐it-­‐all	  thinking	  engaged	  in	  by	  central	  planners	  who	  refuse	  to	  acknowledge	  their	  own	  ignorance.	  Although	  Congress	  has	  overcome	  this	  ban	  by	  authorizing	  a	  trial	  period	  during	  which	  a	  small	  number	  of	  pilots	  will	  be	  armed,	  this	  authorization	  is	  more	  a	  political	  gesture	  than	  a	  substantive	  policy	  reversal.8	  	  As	  long	  as	  central	  planning	  of	  airline	  security	  is	  used,	  there	  is	  no	  efficient	  solution	  for	  the	  knowledge	  problem.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Cleveland	  and	  Price	  (2003),	  p.	  59.	  
	   17	  
Liability	  	  So	  far	  we’ve	  examined	  two	  of	  the	  three	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  externality	  in	  airline	  safety:	  (1)	  taxing	  the	  activity	  that	  generates	  the	  externality	  and	  (2)	  government	  regulation.	  	  	  Now	  consider	  the	  third	  solution:	  liability.	  	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  to	  make	  the	  key	  decision-­‐maker,	  the	  airline,	  liable	  for	  external	  effects	  of	  a	  hijacking.	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  if	  the	  airline	  were	  hijacked	  and	  crashed	  into	  the	  desert,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  external	  effects	  and	  no	  liability.	  	  Of	  course,	  if	  the	  airline	  had	  previously	  chosen	  to	  make	  itself	  liable	  for	  harmed	  passengers,	  that	  would	  simply	  be	  a	  contractual	  matter	  between	  the	  airline	  and	  the	  passengers.	  	  But	  if	  the	  airplane	  were	  hijacked	  and	  crashed	  into	  an	  office	  building,	  the	  damage	  to	  the	  building	  and	  the	  injuries	  and	  deaths	  to	  passengers	  would	  be	  something	  that	  the	  airline	  would	  be	  liable	  for.	  	  	  One	  potential	  problem	  with	  such	  a	  solution	  is	  that	  most	  airlines	  are	  worth	  very	  little.	  	  While	  the	  capital	  value	  of	  Southwest	  Airlines	  on	  February	  2	  (when	  this	  paragraph	  is	  being	  written)	  is	  a	  hefty	  $8.6	  billion,	  American	  Airlines	  and	  U.S.	  Airways,	  by	  contrast,	  are	  worth	  only	  $2.4	  billion	  and	  $1.6	  billion,	  respectively.	  	  These	  low	  values	  would	  make	  it	  hard	  for	  a	  court	  to	  enforce	  meaningful	  liability	  on	  an	  airline	  for	  a	  major	  catastrophe.	  	  	  	  But	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  solution	  to	  this	  problem:	  compulsory	  liability	  insurance.	  	  The	  idea	  would	  be	  to	  require	  the	  airline	  to	  carry	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	  insurance,	  say,	  $5	  billion,	  for	  just	  such	  events.	  	  Because	  the	  probability	  of	  such	  an	  event	  is	  very	  low,	  the	  insurance	  would	  be	  quite	  affordable.	  	  This	  idea,	  though	  untried	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  regulation	  of	  airline	  security,	  is	  not	  novel.	  	  It	  is	  the	  solution	  that	  state	  governments	  use	  for	  automobile	  drivers.	  	  While	  there	  is	  typically	  no	  requirement	  that	  a	  driver	  insure	  against	  losses	  to	  himself,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  drivers	  are	  required	  to	  buy	  liability	  insurance	  for	  damages	  done	  to	  others.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  even	  in	  states	  that	  require	  such	  insurance,	  many	  car	  owners	  fail	  to	  carry	  such	  insurance	  because	  enforcement	  is	  often	  difficult.	  	  But	  enforcement	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of	  compulsory	  liability	  insurance	  would	  be	  much	  easier	  for	  airlines,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  visible	  in	  a	  way	  that	  individual	  car	  owners	  are	  not.	  	  Murphy	  (2011)	  makes	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  the	  liability-­‐plus-­‐compulsory-­‐insurance	  proposal.	  	  Therefore,	  rather	  than	  repeat	  his	  case,	  I’ll	  point	  out	  how	  it	  handles	  the	  knowledge	  problem	  discussed	  above.	  	  	  His	  argument	  is	  that	  because	  airlines,	  prompted	  by	  liability	  insurance	  companies,	  would	  much	  have	  much	  to	  gain,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  lower	  insurance	  premiums,	  by	  increasing	  safety,	  they	  will	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  do	  so.	  	  By	  contrast,	  such	  an	  incentive	  is	  weaker	  in	  any	  of	  the	  three	  versions	  of	  the	  government	  regulation	  solution	  analyzed	  above.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  liability	  insurance	  premiums,	  even	  for	  a	  hefty	  upper	  limit	  on	  the	  liability	  payout,	  would	  be	  low.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  incentive	  to	  achieve	  added	  safety	  would	  be	  weak.	  	  But	  that’s	  not	  a	  problem.	  	  If	  the	  premiums	  are	  low,	  that	  reflects	  a	  low	  estimate	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  catastrophic	  hijacking.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  incentive	  to	  achieve	  added	  safety	  should	  be	  low:	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  added	  safety	  is	  not	  worth	  much.	  	  	  	  
Game	  Theory	  	  One	  advantage	  of	  the	  liability	  solution	  over	  the	  government	  regulatory	  solutions	  is	  that,	  under	  liability,	  airlines	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  look	  ahead	  and	  estimate	  the	  various	  kinds	  and	  probabilities	  of	  threats.	  	  	  Under	  the	  government	  regulatory	  solutions,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  government	  tends	  to	  react	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  terrorist	  threats	  that	  have	  already	  occurred.	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  after	  the	  “shoelace	  bomber”	  was	  restrained	  by	  passengers	  on	  a	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  flight,	  the	  government	  started	  checking	  shoes	  for	  explosives.	  	  	  And	  after	  the	  British	  government	  claimed	  to	  have	  found	  a	  plot	  to	  mix	  liquids	  on	  a	  flight	  to	  create	  an	  explosive	  (a	  claim	  that,	  by	  the	  way,	  is	  still	  controversial),	  the	  U.S.	  government	  limited	  liquids	  to	  no	  more	  than	  three	  ounces	  per	  container	  and	  no	  more	  containers	  than	  can	  be	  fit	  in	  one	  quart—not	  gallon—bag.	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  The	  government,	  in	  short,	  acts	  as	  if	  there	  are	  no	  useful	  insights	  from	  game	  theory.	  The	  essence	  of	  game	  theory	  is	  that	  the	  other	  “players”	  react	  to	  your	  decisions	  and	  that,	  therefore,	  it’s	  important	  to	  think	  through	  their	  probable	  reactions	  in	  choosing	  your	  decisions.	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  if	  box	  cutters,	  which	  were	  used	  on	  September	  11,	  are	  banned,	  potential	  terrorists	  are	  likely	  to	  come	  up	  with	  other	  potential	  weapons.	  	  If	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  blow	  up	  people	  on	  a	  flight,	  a	  terrorist	  might,	  as	  some	  did	  in	  Moscow	  recently,	  blow	  up	  people	  in	  an	  airport.	  	  And	  so	  on.	  	  	  	  Under	  a	  liability	  system,	  managers	  of	  an	  airline	  might,	  even	  if	  there	  were	  a	  credible	  threat	  to	  mix	  liquids	  into	  explosives,	  decide	  that	  the	  benefits	  to	  passengers	  of	  carrying,	  say,	  bottles	  with	  a	  capacity	  of	  up	  to	  750	  milliliters	  outweighed	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  increased	  risk.	  	  If	  so,	  it	  could	  allow	  such	  bottles.	  	  So,	  to	  some	  extent,	  blind	  reaction	  to	  past	  terrorist	  threats	  would	  be	  replaced	  by	  forward-­‐looking	  thinking	  about	  the	  kinds	  and	  probabilities	  of	  terrorist	  threats	  and	  the	  likely	  reactions	  of	  potential	  terrorists	  to	  some	  of	  the	  airlines’	  measures.	  	  
Would	  No	  Extended	  Liability	  and	  No	  Regulation	  be	  Better	  than	  the	  Current	  
System	  	  	  Some	  Numeracy:	  How	  large	  a	  problem?	  	  Mueller	  	  [This	  part	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  written:	  I’ll	  outline	  my	  thoughts	  at	  the	  seminar	  if	  we	  have	  time.]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   20	  
	  	  
References:	  	  Bovard,	  James.	  	  Terrorism	  and	  Tyranny.	  	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  	  2003.	  	  Cleveland,	  Paul	  A.	  and	  Jared	  R.	  Price.	  	  The	  Failure	  of	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  Regulation.	  	  Independent	  Review.	  	  Vol.	  8,	  No.	  1.	  	  Summer	  2003:	  	  53-­‐63.	  	  	  Cordes,	  Joseph	  H.,	  Charlotte	  Kirschner,	  and	  Alice	  Levy.	  	  “Achieving	  Greater	  Homeland	  Security:	  Who	  Should	  Pay,	  and	  How?”	  	  Symposium	  Paper,	  University	  of	  Kentucky,	  Martin	  School	  of	  Public	  Policy	  &	  Administration.	  May	  18-­‐19,	  2006.	  	  Fox	  News.	  	  “TSA	  Will	  Not	  Expand	  Private	  Screening	  Program	  at	  Airports.”	  January	  29,	  2011.	  	  Accessed	  on-­‐line	  on	  January	  31,	  2011	  at:	  http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/01/29/tsa-­‐expand-­‐private-­‐screening-­‐program-­‐airports/	  	  Frank,	  Thomas.	  	  “TSA	  Chief	  John	  Pistole	  to	  Put	  Priority	  on	  Rail,	  Subways.”	  	  USA	  
Today,	  July	  16,	  2010.	  	  Accessed	  on-­‐line	  on	  January	  31,	  2011	  at:	  http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-­‐07-­‐16-­‐tsa16_ST_N.htm	  	  Kunruether,	  Howard,	  Geoffrey	  Heal,	  and	  Peter	  R.	  Orszag.	  	  “Interdependent	  Security:	  Implications	  for	  Homeland	  Security	  Policy	  and	  Other	  Areas.”	  Brookings	  Institution.	  	  Policy	  Brief	  #108.	  	  October	  2002.	  	  Mueller,	  John.	  	  “The	  Quixotic	  Quest	  for	  Invulnerability:	  	  Assessing	  the	  Costs,	  Benefits,	  and	  Probabilities	  of	  Protecting	  the	  Homeland.”	  National	  Convention	  of	  the	  International	  Studies	  Association.	  	  San	  Francisco,	  California.	  	  March	  26-­‐29,	  2008.	  	  Murphy,	  Robert.	  	  “Ensuring—and	  Insuring—Air	  Security.”	  	  February	  7,	  2011.	  http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2011/Murphyairsecurity.html	  	  Niskanen,	  William	  A.	  	  Bureaucracy	  and	  Representative	  Government.	  	  Chicago:	  Aldine-­‐Atherton.	  	  1971.	  	  	  Poole,	  Robert.	  	  “Toward	  Risk-­‐Based	  Aviation	  Security	  Policy.”	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development/International	  Transport	  Forum.	  	  Discussion	  Paper	  No.	  2008-­‐23.	  	  November	  2008.	  	  Viscusi,	  W.	  Kip.	  	  Risk	  by	  Choice.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
